

1918—



—1945

Entered as 2nd class matter

Alfred University Reading Room
 Alfred
 New York ALFRED UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXV, No. 8

DECEMBER 7, 1945

BIG-THREE UNITY JEOPARDIZED BY CONFLICT IN IRAN

THE revolt in northern Iran, which has led in recent weeks to demands for autonomy of Azerbaijan Province lying next to the southern Soviet Republic of the same name, forms another test of Big-Three relations. After Anglo-Russian military forces occupied Iran in January 1942, Iranian sovereignty was guaranteed by treaty. Following the entry of American troops and establishment of the Persian Gulf Command for delivery of lend-lease supplies to Russia, Iranian independence was reaffirmed at the Teheran Conference in 1943. But, as in October 1944, disturbances in Iran's northern provinces have again developed into a controversy between the U.S.S.R. and the Anglo-American powers. For following the present outbreaks on November 23, the Iranian government charged the Soviet Union with fomenting the revolt, which is headed by the Democratic party, successor to the former Communist Tudeh party. Thus far, Russian military forces in Azerbaijan have not allowed Iranian troops to enter the area. And it was announced on December 3 that Moscow had rejected the proposal of Secretary of State Byrnes that the date for withdrawal of all Allied forces from Iran be advanced to January 1, rather than March 2, as had been determined earlier.

THE BIG THREE IN IRAN. Most observers have seen in the recent outbreaks another instance of the new Soviet expansion, similar to the action taken in Eastern Europe by the U.S.S.R. within the past six years, to insure friendly governments along its western frontier. Nor is the parallel with Soviet aims along its China border lost on those who view the Kremlin's policies as a continuation in modern dress of the program followed by successive Czarist régimes. This type of action by the Soviet Union may be viewed in two ways. Those who fear the emergence of the Soviet régime as a world power—but insist that the Western nations continue their his-

toric role of dominance in such dependent areas as the Middle East or various parts of Asia—view the present action of the Russian government with great alarm. Quite naturally, they are now as fearful of Moscow's drive for influence abroad as were statesmen twenty-five years ago or during the Crimean war. Present Soviet policy is also alarming to a second group, who sincerely believe in the necessity of Anglo-American-Russian cooperation. To this group, however, each of the Big Three is currently following alarming unilateral policies in many of the most troubled areas of Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The Soviet Union's resumption of many Russian policies laid down before World War I constitutes a historical lag, but hardly cause for criticism by the Western powers, who have consistently sought similar aims in these areas.

In Iran it is significant that there is a very real possibility the revolt will lead to creation of a new government at Teheran, which may allow secession of Azerbaijan Province. Russia may then achieve the emergence of a friendly government along its southern border, and in due course Azerbaijan may be incorporated in the U.S.S.R. Yet what must not be overlooked in the present great-power conflict in Iran is the fact that Britain and, more recently, the United States have already staked out their claims in that country. With a population of 15,000,000 and an area of 628,000 square miles, Iran would hardly figure as a major pawn in the world power struggle were it not that it lies between Russia and the Persian Gulf, and its oil resources, now largely controlled by American and British companies, are the second largest in the world. Because of its strategic position and its mineral and oil wealth, the United States and Britain would naturally be greatly concerned if northern Iran, now or in the future, were to merge with the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan,

Contents of this BULLETIN may be reprinted with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

regardless of Russia's immediate action with reference to the Teheran agreement.

COOPERATION OR CONFLICT? But in Iran, as in the Far East, there is no possibility that all or any one of the great powers can withdraw from participation in the internal affairs of such areas before they have evolved into truly independent states. What is needed is not a decision as to whether intervention shall be pursued or abandoned. It exists in fact, for good or ill. Concrete progressive measures for liberalizing the political régimes in Iran and other similar dependent areas are needed, following which large-scale economic development must be planned and inaugurated. If this is impracticable from the point of view of domestic politics, especially in the United States where Congress is loath to undertake any such foreign economic ventures, then America should either cease prescribing long-term, highly moralistic policies—by which it also judges other nations' activities abroad without following them itself—or it should pursue with greater foresight and more candor such economic and political penetration throughout the world as is deemed desirable for its security in modern terms and with modern techniques.

In Iran, for example, Russia's historic southern drive may be aided by appeals to the local populace that Soviet dominance will bring a substantial increase in the general standard of living, now woefully low as in most mid-eastern countries. But the present British Labor government has only begun to

study plans for general economic cooperation with Iran and other Arab states, while the United States thus far has hardly approached the problem from this point of view. Yet only common state action by America and Britain with Russia—which concessionaires like the private oil interests of the Western powers are at present not willing or organized to give—will offer sufficient counterweight to the demands or plans of Iran's northern neighbor.

If, however, America and Britain choose to continue the power struggle on effective terms in dependent areas such as Iran, the full consequences of such action should be brought home to the public. For, lacking Big-Three cooperative endeavor to ease tensions in Iran and elsewhere, war will ultimately result. And while there is no thought at present that the Iranian crisis will move beyond the stage of straining for advantage by each of the great powers vitally interested, there is no hope that clear-cut decisions which will avoid violent conflicts later can be made so long as each nation jockeys for position in either an economic or political sense. Larger issues, which have up to the moment defied resolution among the Big Three, will not be solved unless Britain, Russia and the United States are prepared to deal cooperatively with the less universal, but onerous, tasks of improving conditions in areas where their interests now collide so that tensions both among the local inhabitants and themselves may be alleviated.

GRANT S. McCLELLAN

WORLD COOPERATION—REALITY OR MYTH TO AMERICANS?

In two plays now running concurrently in Paris—*Antigone* and *La Sauvage*—a young French playwright, Jean Anouilh, probes a fundamental moral question of our times. This question is whether, in an admittedly horrible and confused world, we as individuals have the right to seek escape from responsibility in personal happiness, or must accept the burden of responsibility, no matter what it costs us, even if it is life itself.

Millions of Europeans have had to answer this question under harrowing circumstances—and the way in which they have answered it has in each case proved the most crucial test of their convictions that human beings can possibly undergo. Both in *Antigone*, drawn from classic tragedy and played with the dignity of the ancient world, although in modern dress and with modern tenseness, and in *La Sauvage*, laid in a sordid contemporary setting, the conclusion is the same: the individual, if he or she is at all sensitive to human suffering, cannot find satisfaction in personal happiness in a period of universal crisis. However insignificant the contribution the individual can make, responsibility cannot be avoided. When taunted by her worldly dictator-uncle,

Creon, concerning the limitations of her accomplishment, undertaken at terrible risk, Antigone retorts with the unforgettable phrase: *On doit faire ce que l'on peut.* (One must do what one can.)

"ONE MUST DO WHAT ONE CAN." Not only every individual, but every nation, could well be guided by this precept. No one expects miracles, or even selflessness, from any nation. But surely every nation which, in this time of agonizing crisis, fails to do what it can, is guilty of a great betrayal. We in the United States have demonstrated during the war that we are capable of united and energetic action in building a vast industrial machine capable of serving the needs not only of our own enormous armed forces, but also those of our allies. Yet because we have experienced so little of the moral self-searching undergone by the peoples of Europe, we now appear tragically inadequate to the tasks of reconstruction.

OUR THREE MAJOR ERRORS. Our persistent tradition of subordinating foreign policy to domestic political considerations has led us to commit, since V-J Day, at least three major errors whose repercussions on Europe it will be difficult, perhaps

impossible, to correct. First, we promptly removed food rationing controls, apparently on the theory that this was a politically desirable thing to do. Actually, the American people had been prepared, during the war, to accept the continuance of these controls in order to alleviate the sufferings of other peoples, and there is good reason to believe that, had the Administration had the courage to explain the issue clearly to the public, there would have been enthusiastic response to a program of sharing our surpluses with the rest of the world, even if these had to be given away in the form of gifts. To think otherwise is to assume that we are both stupid and heartless, which our previous response to appeals for relief would certainly refute.

Second, the Administration conveyed the impression that the United States, proud possessor of the secret of the atomic bomb (which, as a matter of fact, it shares with Britain, Canada, and the scientists of several other nations), would hold on to this secret either as a bargaining weapon or, even worse, as a threat to nations that might have the temerity to oppose us. The courageous stand of American scientists, who on this occasion displayed a remarkable sense of social responsibility, would have been loudly echoed by large sections of American public opinion had our political leaders taken the risk of consulting the public. But here again the Administration acted on the belief that the lowest common denominator of judgment and conscience is representative of the American people as a whole. The Attlee-Truman-Mackenzie King conversations offered an opportunity to alter somewhat our original dogmatic decision about control of the atomic bomb, but the ill-effects of that decision had already permeated the international atmosphere. Our third major error is the Administration's failure to declare officially that the United States will remain in Germany as long as this may prove necessary—although

it becomes daily more obvious that lack of such assurance keeps Europe in a state of dangerous unease, and impedes stabilization of the continent, which should be one of our primary concerns.

LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP. To one returning from Europe it is not the Europeans—cold, hungry and miserable as they are in the wake of the six years' war—who are most to be pitied, but ourselves. We are to be pitied because we are displaying less courage, less stamina, less capacity to take great risks for great ends than some of the peoples of a war-ravaged continent. What is most alarming is not only the lack of constructive leadership on the part of the Executive, but the disturbing silence of members of Congress on controversial issues. Why do we hear so little from the Fulbrights and the Balls, the Saltonstalls and the Morses, about Anglo-American economic relations, about food rationing controls, about our future policy in Germany? Is it possible that all we can do is to orate eloquently about international cooperation in general, only to evade responsibility when we must pass from the general to the particular? There is always danger of apathy after the strain of a prolonged war effort. But surely we are not as weary as the British and the Russians, the French and the Norwegians—yet the tone of our discussions of world affairs is disturbingly frivolous and adolescent.

It sometimes does seem as if men had lost control of events. Panic fear stalks the world—fear of known dangers, but even more of those unknown yet dimly apprehended. We have every reason to despair; but none of us has the right to do so. The one thing we must refuse to do is to remain indifferent to the crisis that is shaking the foundations of our world. We cannot all perform heroic deeds. But as Antigone says with classic simplicity: One must do what one can.

We are a great nation—great not only in wealth and technical genius, but also in compassion and sense of comradeship. We must act greatly. Nothing less is worthy of us. We must act so as to give others the assurance that all hope is not lost. Only by thus reassuring others can we reassure ourselves.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(Mrs. Dean has just returned from a two months' trip to Europe undertaken at the invitation of the Office of War Information. She was the guest in Britain of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and lectured at Chatham House in London, and at the branches of the Institute in Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow and Manchester. In Paris she addressed the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère and the Centre d'Etudes des Cadres. She also visited Germany at the invitation of the State Department.)

For background on Brazil's first Presidential elections in 15 years, read:

BRAZIL: RISING POWER IN THE AMERICAS

by Olive Holmes


25c

October 15 issue of FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS
REPORTS are published on the 1st and 15th of each month.
Subscription \$5; to F.P.A. members, \$3.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXV, No. 8, DECEMBER 7, 1945. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, *President*; DOROTHY F. LEET, *Secretary*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Five Dollars a Year
Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.

Washington News Letter



WILL HURLEY RESIGNATION AFFECT U.S. INTERVENTION IN CHINA?

During the 1944 Presidential campaign the two major political parties agreed not to make an issue of foreign policy. This truce helped to unite the country behind the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and the San Francisco charter but, at the same time, weakened United States foreign policy by removing the invigorating criticism and enlightening publicity that go with constant political debate. That the truce is crumbling is indicated by Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley's censure of our China policy on November 27, when he resigned as Ambassador to China. Foreign policy once more is openly a political issue in the United States, and discussion of it probably will increase as the 1946 Congressional elections near.

EFFECT OF HURLEY'S STATEMENT. The Hurley statement made it clear that China today is a composite of all the problems in foreign policy facing the United States. The foremost question raised by China is whether we shall put our whole hope for security in the United Nations Organization, whose General Assembly is to meet in January for the first time, or rely also on force of arms and unilateral political decisions. Ambassador Hurley followed the latter policy by arming and transporting troops of the recognized government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to North China, where they confront the rebel forces of the unrecognized Communist régime. Political experts on the Far East in the State Department opposed this military assistance as intervention in a civil war which we might not be able to carry through to conclusion should internal strife result in an international war. Hurley resigned after Representative de Lacy, Democrat of Washington, criticized him on the basis of arguments which Hurley thought de Lacy obtained from the State Department.

China also poses two main problems that arise in connection with United States relations with Russia. In the field of military security, the question arises whether our goal should be to maintain Chinese unity through help to Chiang Kai-shek, in order to prevent Russia from possibly manipulating a Communist government of North China if the country were divided under two régimes. In the field of ideology a problem of principle is involved, centering on whether we should intervene abroad in order to protect our "free enterprise system."

Senator Kenneth S. Wherry, Republican of Nebraska, who on November 29 asked that a special Senate committee be appointed to investigate the State Department, proposed specifically that the com-

mittee inquire whether employees of the Department were encouraging the establishment of Communist forms of government abroad. The House Committee on un-American Affairs, which focuses its attention on Communist activities in the United States, invited Hurley to appear before it. The issue of free enterprise, as it applies to China, is not a clear-cut debate between communism and American democracy, however, for the Chiang Kai-shek government which Hurley supports is tyrannical and oppressive.

Furthermore, the China question directs public attention to the way in which foreign policy is conceived and carried out by the United States. The administration of foreign affairs is confused today because its control is divided. Maintaining that Ambassadors should set policy (within the limits of their instructions from the President), Hurley protested in his statement of resignation that career officers in the State Department opposed his policy and resorted to "leaking" to the press and Congress in order to gain support for their view. While Ambassadors were not considered independent agents in the past, the State Department—behind the screen of the political truce—has become less and less efficient both in making foreign policy and in asserting its leadership respecting foreign affairs within the executive branch of the federal government. Below the Presidency, the leadership has passed in many instances to the War Department. Foreign policy today is made by whatever official happens to be on the scene.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S PREDICAMENT. As far as China is concerned, President Truman is said to regard his appointment of General George C. Marshall, former Army Chief of Staff, to the temporary post of special envoy as the first step toward adoption of a policy that will serve our interests and be acceptable to the public. But the questions raised by Hurley transcend China and reach all around the world. They go to the heart of the developing issue over our international position. Whereas a few years ago the dispute lay between isolation and internationalism, the issue now is between a nationalist expansion of United States interests overseas and cooperative internationalism. Hurley leans toward the former, while Truman continues to believe in cooperation. On November 28 he restated his faith in the United Nations Organization and expressed his hope that his country and the U.S.S.R. could work together.

BLAIR BOLLES